Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)

Codebook

PRIF Dataset on Humanitarian Military Interventions after 1945

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For questions on the project, the dataset or this codebook contact:
Thorsten Gromes (gromes@prif.org)

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Introduction

Since the 1990s, humanitarian military interventions are among the most controversially discussed issues in Peace Research as well as in Political Theory, International Law, International Relations, and other related disciplines. Despite the large interest in this topic, we lack empirical studies that compare more than a few cases. This research gap is largely the result of missing reliable data on humanitarian military interventions. A pilot study, funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research, aimed at generating this kind of data and constructed a documented dataset on all humanitarian military interventions after World War II. It is available at: http://www.humanitarian-military-interventions.com/.[1]
This documented dataset provides information about key aspects of humanitarian military interventions after 1945. Among those aspects are the situation in the target country of the intervention, the authorizing institution, intervening states, declared goals, deployed troops, their activities, and the effects of interventions in the target countries. By providing comparable data covering the entire universe of relevant cases, we create the basis for further quantitative as well as qualitative analyses.
The dataset provides the foundation for further research on the causes of success or failure of humanitarian interventions as well as related research topics. It presents not only a data table with all values but also descriptions of all cases that document and substantiate the coding decisions.
Data collection followed a standard routine. Two collaborators initially collected information on each intervention and drafted case descriptions independently of one another. They then addressed discrepancies and produced a consolidated version. Finally, external experts evaluated the case descriptions.
The compilation includes two types of military interventions:

1. interventions that we clearly identify as humanitarian;
2. interventions we categorize as borderline cases of humanitarian military interventions, as some defining criteria are not clearly met.

The tabular dataset comes in two forms. The first treats an entire intervention as unit of analysis and the second each intervention-year.

Definition of a humanitarian military intervention

"Humanitarian military intervention" is a contested notion. Nevertheless, the vast majority of contributions share a conceptual core of three elements in defining humanitarian military intervention: (1)

1 Older versions of the dataset will be archived at this website.

the threat or use of force abroad by a state or group of states with (2) the purpose of "saving strangers", (3) from an ongoing violent emergency.

The definition confined to these three core elements suffices to describe military interventions for explicitly humanitarian purposes.

The aim of protecting "nationals of the target state" (Murphy 1996: 11f.) or "individuals other than its own citizens" (Holzgrefe 2003: 18) or more briefly of "saving strangers" (Wheeler 2000) distinguishes humanitarian military interventions from self-defense, rescue missions for a state's own citizens or military endeavors that pursue non-humanitarian purposes such as territorial aggrandizement or regional dominance. We establish the presence of a humanitarian motivation by asking whether decision-makers expressly claim the objective of stopping or reducing violence within the target country. If we argued that no additional motivations may exist to qualify for such a mission, we would hardly find any cases of humanitarian military intervention. Thus, we admit that the impulse to save strangers is often accompanied by self-interested motivations (Eisner 1993: 202; Hehir 2012: 138). Additional motives may include an interest to prevent refugee flows which could affect the intervening party's stability or to prevent state failure that could allow international terrorist groups to turn ungoverned territory into staging areas (Seybolt 2007: 20, 27). However, such additional motives and the declared humanitarian purpose must not be mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, if, for example, an intervener denies the target state's right of existence or claims part of its territory, we do not consider the intervention to be humanitarian.

According to the established definition, humanitarian military interventions imply either the threat or the use of force in reaction to violations of fundamental human rights. Thereby, humanitarian military interventions are to be differentiated from uncontested relief missions following natural disasters.

According to Holzgrefe (2003: 18), preventive missions and robust post-war peacekeeping may qualify as humanitarian military interventions. In our view, missions with the objective of preventing violence or a relapse into violence differ substantially from interventions confronted with ongoing violence. Thus, we include only those interventions that respond to an existing violent emergency.[2] Following established quantitative war studies we define a violent emergency by setting a threshold for casualties: Violent emergencies are defined as armed conflicts between the government and rebels, non-state conflicts or one-sided violence against civilians which have led to the loss of at least 25 lives in one calendar year. Since humanitarian military interventions focus on civilians, data would ideally distinguish reliably between civilian and other victims. Assessing the number of deaths in intrastate conflicts is already notoriously difficult. Differentiating between combatant and civilian deaths proves even more challenging, as the status of combatant is often fuzzy in such conflicts (Seybolt et al. 2013).

2 A preventive mission becomes a humanitarian military intervention when an emergency occurs following a deployment and when intervening troops remain in the country and attempt to stop violence by use of force.

The UCDP datasets provide the most comprehensive data on direct fatalities due to organized violence. They address the problem of differentiating between combatants and civilian deaths without solving it. Even UCDP's Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg/Melander 2013) does not overcome this vagueness, as it often assigns large numbers of deaths to the category of "unknown status". Thus, for conceptual reasons and lack of alternatives, we consider all deaths reported by UCDP to identify violent emergencies and ascertain the number of fatalities.

In a study on conceptual controversies over humanitarian military interventions (Dembinski et al. 2018), we systematically discuss claims that the definition needs additional elements. The five most prominent supplements are: 1) The intervention must not be permitted by government of the target state. 2) It has no approval by the United Nations Security Council. 3) The intervention is exclusively motivated by the aim of saving strangers. 4) It responds to conscious-shocking mass crimes. 5) The humanitarian military intervention stops or mitigates the violent emergency. In our view, these aspects should be used for examining but not for defining humanitarian military interventions. However, as all of them are included in our dataset and documented in the case descriptions, users who insist on one of these additional definition elements can easily adapt the data to their preferences.

In sum, our project uses the following definition: A humanitarian military intervention is the use of force or the threat to use force across state borders by a state or group of states with the declared intention of saving strangers menaced by a violent emergency that has already led to at least 25 fatalities in one calendar year.

A borderline case of a humanitarian military intervention is given when one of the following conditions is fulfilled:

1) It is uncertain whether moves and motivations that counteract the declared humanitarian purpose are present.
2) The intervener also defends itself and had no further counteracting motivation.
3) The violent emergency ends between the decision to intervene and the actual deployment of troops.

In some cases, several humanitarian military interventions succeed each other. A mere change of the intervening organizations or states or activities does not constitute a new intervention. A (succeeding) intervention is treated as a new intervention, if the intervention's direction changes substantially. This criterion is met

- when a formerly impartial intervention is now directed against one party to the conflict or
- when an intervention that was directed against one party to the conflict becomes impartial (see the item TARGET).

Head of the case description

Short title of the intervention (HMIID)

- Target country & years of intervention (e.g. Kosovo 1999)

Year of the intervention (YEAR)

- Year of the intervention

This information is only given in the intervention-year dataset but not in the intervention dataset and in the case descriptions.

World Bank country code of the target country (WBCC)

- country code
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: World Bank.

Use the country code provided by the World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org/ (data => by country => download data => MetaData countries).

Correlates of War (COW) country code of the target country (COWCCnew and COWCC)

- country code
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes/cow-country-codes). COWCCCnew relates to codes since July 2019, COWCC to codes until July 2019.

Conflict identification in UCDP datasets (UCDPID)

- conflictID (e.g. 395)
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: “ConflictID” in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

Actor identification of the local parties to the conflict in UCDP datasets (ACTORID)

- actorID (e.g. 1200)
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Sources: "SideBID" in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, "ActorID" or "Coalition Components" in the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset, "SideAID" and "SideBID" in the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, "side_a_dset_id" and "side_b_dset_id" in the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.

Status of the intervention (STATUS)

- borderline case of humanitarian military intervention 1
- clear case of humanitarian military intervention 2

Ad code 1) There are doubts whether counteracting moves or motives were present. Alternatively, the intervention developed out of self-defense but no additional counteracting motives were given. If the violent emergency ends between the authorization of the intervention and troop deployment, it also counts as a borderline case.

Ad code 2) The intervention fulfilled the criteria of a humanitarian military intervention, as there were

- a violent emergency and
- a use of force or the threat to use force and
- the declared intention of saving strangers and
- the declared intention of saving strangers was not counteracted.

Report both the code (0, 1 or 2) and its meaning (clearly no case…, borderline case…, clear case).

Date of the start of the intervention (HMISTART)

- (Day), month, year (e.g. 24 March 1999)

See HMISTAPR for how to determine the date.

If possible, report the date of the troop deployment. If this is impossible, refer to the date of the mandate.

Note that in some cases the date of the troop deployment is not necessarily the same as the start of the intervention. If foreign troops had already been deployed in the country for other purposes, but are later authorized to use force with the expressed aim of saving strangers, give as the start of the intervention the date of this authorization.

Precision of the intervention's start date (HMISTAPR)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

We adapt the coding scheme used in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 4-2014 (2014: 10) for determining the start date of armed conflicts:

- Day, month and year are precisely coded; we have good information. 1
- Day is assigned; month and year are precisely coded. 2
- Day is unknown; a period of 30 days (not necessarily a calendar month) and year are precisely coded. The day is known to be in a given period, but we are missing information on an exact date. Day is then set to the last day of the period. 3
- Month is assigned; year is coded precisely. 4
- Day and month are unknown, year is coded precisely. If the intervention is known to have started sometime between January and August, the date is coded as 31 August of the coded year. 5
- Wide disagreement between different sources, so that not even year can be coded precisely. The start year is assigned based on subjective judgment. Day and month are set as the 31 December of the coded year. 6
- Year is missing. No information on the start date is available; the start date is set to 31 December of the first year recorded. 7
- Not relevant. -88

Date of the end of the intervention (HMIEND)

- The intervention is ongoing at the time of coding 0
- The intervention has ended (day), month, year

See HMIENDPR for how to determine the date.

See the explanations on ENDTYPE.

Precision of the intervention's end date (HMIENDPR)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

We adapt the coding scheme for the end date of armed conflicts in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 4-2014 (2014: 11-12):

- Day, month and year are precisely coded; we have good information. 1
- Day is assigned; month and year are precisely coded. 2
- Day is unknown; a period of 30 days (not necessarily a calendar month) and year are precisely coded. The day is known to be in a given period, but we are missing information on an exact date. Day is then set to the last day of the period. 3
- Month is assigned; year is coded precisely. 4
- Day and month are unknown, year is coded precisely. If the end is known to have taken place sometime between January and August, the date is coded as 31 August of the coded year. 5
- Wide disagreement between different sources, so that not even year can be coded precisely. The end year is assigned based on subjective judgment. Day and month are set as the 31 December of the coded year. 6
- Year is missing. No information on the end date is available; the end date is set to 31 December of the first year recorded. 7
- Not relevant. -88

Type of the intervention's ending (ENDTYPE)

Report both the code and the explanation, i.e. use one of the following options:

- the intervention is ongoing at the time of coding 0
- end of the violent emergency 1
- replacement by another humanitarian military intervention 2
- end of the humanitarian military intervention without a replacement by another while the emergency continued 3

Explanations:

Ad code 1) The violent emergency ends, while the intervening forces are still present. In such cases, refer to the date of the violent emergency's ending (see VIOEND). If the violent emergency ends immediately after the beginning of the intervention, code the case nevertheless.

Ad code 2) The violent emergency goes on, but the humanitarian military intervention is replaced by another one whose mandate and activities clearly differ from the first intervention. Report the HMIID of the second intervention (see explanation on a new humanitarian military intervention in the chapter on definitions).

Ad code 3) The intervening forces leave the country or change their status, i.e. they stop using or threatening to use force or they abandon the declared aim of "saving strangers", although the violent emergency continues. The humanitarian military intervention also ends when counteracting motives occur in the course of the deployment. In such cases, report the date the interveners leave or change their status.

Related cases in the dataset

- Target country & years of intervention

There are two types of related cases:

1. other interventions in the same country that are documented in our compilation;
2. interventions in other violent emergencies that are related to the case under consideration, e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone.

If there is more than one related case, first report the intervention(s) in the same country in chronological order, then present the remaining cases in alphabetical order.

Summary

The head of the case description is followed by a summary with brief information on

- the kind of violent emergency the interveners claim to react to and relevant local parties to the conflict (without background information on the emergency's causes and chronology),
- whether the UN Security Council authorized or approved the intervention,
- whether the intervention was unilateral (conducted by only one state) or multilateral (conducted by two states or more),
- whether the intervention was clearly a humanitarian military intervention, a borderline case, or is not classified as humanitarian military intervention,
- the main activities of the intervention,
- whether the violent emergency was terminated within twelve months after the intervention's beginning.

The summary has to be comprehensible without reading the rest of the case description.

The violent emergency in the target country

Open up this section of the case description by providing basic information on the violent emergency. Report the parties to the conflict, their most important supporters, and their central objectives. Give references for the presented information. Do not discuss causes of the conflict and do not present a chronology of the violent emergency.

Date of the beginning of the violent emergency (VIOSTART)

- (Day,) month, year
- No data -99

Sources: For violent emergencies before 1989: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and case literature, for violent emergencies since 1989: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset and case literature.
For cases included in the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset:
Use the case literature to identify the violent emergency the intervention reacts to. The violent emergency can relate to a state-based conflict, to one or several non-state conflicts, and to one-sided violence against civilians or a combination of these types of organized violence as defined by the UCDP. When we assess the start, end, and extent of deadly violence, we consider all these types of organized violence if relevant.
Select the relevant conflicts in the target country in the column “conflict_name.” Base this selection on the case literature and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. Document which conflicts in the relevant period of time are excluded or, if easier, are included.
Sort “date_start” in ascending order. Identify the first calendar year with at least 25 fatalities in the best estimates (“best”). In this year, find the date of the first event with at least one fatality in the best estimates and use it for coding VIOSTART. Some cases, for example Afghanistan, exhibit a continuing violent emergency that started before 1989. Here, use the case literature to identify a date that clearly marks a new phase of violence.
In some cases, several violent emergencies take place at the same time and the intervention under consideration responds only to one of them. Here, the same actor can be involved in more than one emergency. For example, the government can commit one-sided violence against civilians in different conflicts. Information on the specific location (“where_coordinates,” “where_description,” “adm_1,” and “adm_2”) can help select the relevant events. Document which locations are included or excluded.

Date of the ending of the violent emergency (VIOEND)

- The emergency was ongoing at the time of coding 0
- (Day,) month, year of the emergency's ending
- No data -99

On sources and procedure: see VIOSTART.

Identify the last calendar year with at least 25 fatalities in the best estimates ("best"). In this year, find the date of the last event with at least one fatality in the best estimates and use it for coding VIOEND.

Duration of the ongoing violent emergency prior to the intervention (VIODURAT)

- number of months
- no data -99

From 16 days upwards round to a whole month. If the violent emergency was ongoing for less than 16 days, report "0" for the number of months.

Example: According to UCDP, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started on 30 April 1992. The humanitarian military intervention began on 12 April 1993. Thus, we have to calculate the period between 30 April 1992 and 11 April 1993, the last day before the intervention. The result is eleven months and twelve days, so the code is "11".

While reporting on the following variables, include one or two sentences on the general pattern of violence and give references for your assessment.

Was there an ongoing violent emergency characterized by a state-based armed conflict when the intervention began? (CONFLICT)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources (each with the most recent version): UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (armed conflicts and non-state conflicts), PITF datasets on revolutionary and ethnic civil wars, case-specific literature.

Our understanding of a state-based armed conflict is based on the definition by UCDP: "A state-based armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory (…) between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state".[3]

3 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.

A violent emergency is ongoing, if, at the beginning of the intervention, there is a state-based armed conflict, a non-state conflict, or one-sided violence. All three of them can occur in the same country at the same time.

Code "1" for the presence of a state-based armed conflict, if it was given in any period of the ongoing violent emergency the intervention reacts to. Example: An intervention started on 1 June 1993. At this time, the emergency was characterized only by one-sided violence. However, if the criteria of a state-based armed conflict were fulfilled until 30 March 1993 and the emergency was not interrupted since then, as one-sided violence was ongoing until 1 June 1993, the code "1" is justified.

Was there an ongoing violent emergency characterized by one-sided violence when the intervention began? (VIOLENCE)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, PITF dataset on genocides and politicides, case-specific literature.

Again, the project takes UCDP definitions as a starting point: One-sided violence is the "use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians." An organised group "uses armed force (…) and meets at least one of the following organisational requirements: there must be a clear pattern of incidents which are connected, or there must be evidence that violence was planned in advance."[4]

A violent emergency is ongoing, if, at the beginning of the intervention, there is a state-based armed conflict, a non-state conflict, or one-sided violence. All three of them can occur in the same country at the same time.

Code "1" for the presence of one-sided violence, if it was given in any period of the ongoing violent emergency the intervention reacts to. Example: An intervention started on 1 June 2000. At this time, the emergency was characterized only by a state-based armed conflict. However, if the criteria of one-sided violence were fulfilled until 30 April 2000 and the emergency was not interrupted since then, as a state-based armed conflict was ongoing until 1 June 2000, the code "1" is justified.

4 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.

Main conflict issue according to UCDP (ISSUE)

- territory 1
- government 2
- territory and government 3

Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version, case-specific literature.

We use the UCDP/PRIO coding scheme for their variable "INCOMPATIBILITY." If UCDP does not cover the conflict, we code in accordance with the case-specific literature.

Was there an ongoing violent emergency characterized by non-state conflicts when the intervention started? (NONSTATE)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, case-specific literature.

Non-state conflicts are characterized by a situation of widespread deadly violence that is not categorized as a "state-based armed conflict" or "one-sided violence". Partial or complete state collapse is often the background condition of this kind of violence. UCDP defines non-state conflicts as the "use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state". A violent emergency is ongoing, if, at the beginning of the intervention, there is a state-based armed conflict, a non-state conflict, or one-sided violence. All three of them can occur in the same country at the same time.

Code "1" for the presence of a non-state conflict, if it was given in any period of the ongoing violent emergency the intervention reacts to. Example: An intervention started on 1 August 2010. At this time, the emergency was characterized only by a state-based armed conflict. However, if the criteria of a non-state conflict violence were fulfilled until 30 June 2010 and the emergency was not interrupted since then, as a state-based armed conflict was ongoing until 1 August 2010, the code "1" is justified.

Polarity of the conflict that attracted the intervention (POLARITY)

- bi-polar 2
- multi-polar 3
- unclear -77

Sources: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, case-specific literature.

A violent conflict is bi-polar when all or almost all its violence occurs between only two camps of groups. Several groups can be in the same camp defined by a common agenda. A violent conflict is multi-polar, if there are at least three camps with opposing demands that fight each other.

Number of fatalities in the target country due to the violent emergency prior to the intervention (FATALITY)

- exact number of fatalities
- no data -99

Sources: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset and case-specific literature.

You will need data on fatalities for this item and for the items FATAL1, FATAL2, and FATALCOM.

If the violent emergency is considered in the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset, add up the best estimates of fatalities ("best") for the period from the start date of the violent emergency (VIOSTART) until the day before the start of the humanitarian military intervention (HMISTART).

Some events in the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset span several days, weeks or even months. A humanitarian military intervention can start during such longer events. In these cases, distribute the number of fatalities evenly over time. For example, an event lasts from 1 January to 10 January and results in ten fatalities. The intervention starts on 7 January. Consequently, six fatalities are considered for the time prior to the intervention, four for the intervention period.

Violent emergencies before 1989, very recent cases, and some others are not considered in the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. For these cases, rely, if possible, on the case specific literature to assess the range of fatalities before and during the intervention. Reports of Truth Commissions can be particularly helpful.

Size of the target country of the intervention (AREA)

- The target country's area in square kilometers (rounded to thousand)
- no data -99

Size of the area affected by the violent emergency in the target country of the intervention (AREAA)

- The size of the affected area in square kilometers (rounded to thousand)
- no data -99

Source: case-specific literature.

Population of the target country at the time of intervention (POPULAT)

- number of residents (rounded to hundred thousand)
- no data -99

Sources: World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/ => data => by country), national census data.

For the intervention dataset, report the data provided by the World Bank or by national census for the first year of intervention or, if not available, for the year closest to the intervention's first year.

For the intervention-year dataset, report the annualized data provided by the World Bank or by national census.

In the sentence that explains your code, round the census data to thousand, e.g. write: "In 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a population of about 4,377,000", do not cite the original number reported (4,377,033). The code has to be rounded to hundred thousand, i.e. **[POPULAT=4400000]**.

Population of the area affected by the violent emergency target country at the time of intervention (POPULATA)

- number of residents (rounded to hundred thousand)
- no data -99

Source: case-specific literature.

For the intervention dataset, report the population of the affected area for the first year of intervention or, if not available, for the year closest to the intervention's first year.

For the intervention-year dataset, calculate the ratio of POPULATA to POPULAT for the first year of the intervention or, if not available, for the year closest to the intervention's first year. Use this ratio to calculate POPULATA in the following years.

Location of the target country of intervention (REGION)

- Africa 1
- Americas 2
- Asia 3
- Europe 4
- Middle East 5
- Oceania 6

Use the delimitation provided by UCDP at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php.

This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

Non-military interventions and agreements

Did mediation in the violent emergency or the latent conflict take place during the last six months prior to the intervention? (MEDIATE6)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: Civil Wars Mediation Dataset (DeRouen/Bercovitch), International Crisis Behavior Dataset (Brecher et al. 2016), case-specific literature.

First, use the data provided by the Civil Wars Mediation Dataset. If the case is missing there, complement the information by using the International Crisis Behavior Dataset.

This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

Did mediation in the violent emergency take place during the intervention? (MEDIATEI)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no, but the intervention is ongoing -77
- no data -99

Sources: Civil Wars Mediation Dataset (DeRouen/Bercovitch), International Crisis Behavior Dataset (Brecher et al. 2016), case-specific literature.

This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

Did the parties to the conflict sign a ceasefire agreement or a peace accord during the last six months prior to the intervention? (ACCORD6)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: UN Peacemaker, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, case-specific literature.

This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

Did the parties to the conflict sign a ceasefire agreement or a peace accord during the intervention? (ACCORDI)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no, but the intervention is ongoing -77
- no data -99

Sources: UN Peacemaker, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, case-specific literature.

This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

Was an arms embargo imposed on (certain organizations or individuals in) the target country during the last six months prior to the intervention? (EMBARGO6)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: SIPRI Arms Embargo Archive, case-specific literature.

This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

Was an arms embargo imposed on (certain organizations or individuals in) the target country during the intervention? (EMBARGOI)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no, but the intervention is ongoing -77
- no data -99

Sources: SIPRI Arms Embargo Archive, case-specific literature.

This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

The military intervention

Did the intervention start during the Cold War? (COLDWAR)

- no 0
- yes 1

We define the Cold War period as beginning on 1 January 1947 and ending on 31 December 1989.
This code is only reported in the data table but not in the case description.

Did the United Nations Security Council mandate or approve the intervention? (UNSC)

- no 0
- yes 2

Source: United Nations Security Council.
It is crucial to cite the initial resolution that mandates or approves the intervention. Approval means that the Security Council explicitly welcomes the intervention by others.
Note that it is not necessary that the mandate or approval had been given before the intervention began.

Did a regional organization approve the military intervention? (REGIOORG)

- no 0
- yes, but not all interveners or all activities 1
- yes, all interveners and all their activities 2

Sources: the respective regional organization, case-specific literature.
Consider only regional organizations in which the target country was a member at the time of the intervention. Report the regional organization in the case description. If there was no regional organization, code "0".
Note for the codes "1" and "2" that it is not necessary that the approval had been given before the intervention began.

Did the government in power of the target country permit the intervention? (GOVTPERM)

- no 0
- yes, but not all interveners or all activities 1
- yes, all interveners and all their activities 2
- unclear -77
- no data -99

Sources: UNSC resolutions, declarations by regional organizations, case-specific literature.

Note that the code “0” also applies in situations in which there is no government. Code “1” also applies in situations in which the government of the target state changed its position during the course of the intervention.

Who intervened? (INTERVEN1)

- name of the intervening international organization or state

There are four possibilities:

1. If a single state intervenes, report its name.
2. If a coalition of states intervenes, report the most important state and the second-most important state under INTERVEN2 and the third-most important state under INTERVEN3. The importance is usually measured by the number of deployed troops.
3. If the UN intervenes, just report the UN.
4. If a regional security organization intervenes, report only its name in the code but mention the three most important participating states in the case description. If states participate that are not members of the regional organization, report the most important of them under INTERVEN2 and INTERVEN3. The importance is measured by the number of deployed troops.

It can be difficult to assess whether an intervention is conducted by a coalition of states (2) or by a regional organization (4). The latter case applies if the responsible bodies of the regional organization decided to intervene.

In the case descriptions and the intervention dataset the coding relates to the intervention’s entire duration.

Correlates of War (COW) country code of INTERVEN1 (I1CCCnew and I1CCC)

- country code

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Sources: Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes/cow-country-codes). I1CCCnew relates to codes since July 2019, I1CCC to codes until July 2019.

Was the most important intervener a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council? (P5)

- no 0
- yes 1

USA, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The code is "1" for "yes" in unilateral interventions by at least one of these states. The code is also "1" for "yes", if the most important intervener was an international organization and one of the P5 participated in the entire intervention with the largest or second-largest contingent of troops.

Who else intervened? (INTERVEN2)

- name of the intervening international/regional organization or states
- not relevant, as there is only one intervener -88

See the explanation for INTERVEN1.

Correlates of War (COW) country code of INTERVEN2 (I2CCCnew and I2CCC)

- country code
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Sources: Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes/cow-country-codes). I2CCCnew relates to codes since July 2019, I2CCC to codes until July 2019.

Who else intervened? (INTERVEN3)

- name of the intervening international/regional organization or states
- not relevant, as there is only one intervener -88

See the explanation for INTERVEN1.

Correlates of War (COW) country code of INTERVEN3 (I3CCCnew and I3CCC)

- country code
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Sources: Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes/cow-country-codes). I3CCCnew relates to codes since July 2019, I3CCC to codes until July 2019.

Was one of the three most important interveners a former colonial power or mandate power of the target country or are this intervener and the target country successors of a common state? (COLONY)

- no 0
- yes 1

Source: country profiles, case-specific literature.

The code is "1" for yes, if a former colonial power or mandate is power is listed as INTERVEN1, INTERVEN2, or INTERVEN3 or contributes most or second-most troops to the organization that is listed as INTERVEN1. Note that mere occupation does not suffice to be a colonial power. The criterion of a common state only relates to Russian interventions in other former republics of the Soviet Union. Here the same coding logic applies as for former colonial powers.

In the intervention dataset the coding relates to the intervention's first year.

Did the interveners declare the objective of saving strangers? (SAVING)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: authorizing texts and in statements of highest-ranking decision-makers shortly before or at the intervention's beginning. If primary sources are not available, also consider secondary sources.

Statements as the following indicate the intention of saving strangers:

- "to stop violence/fighting/massacre/ethnic cleansing/grave violations of humanitarian law"
- "to prevent further fighting/massacre/ethnic cleansing/grave violations of humanitarian law"
- "to restore/enforce peace"
- "to protect civilians/(group of) people/citizens"
- "to deliver/protect humanitarian aid/assistance"

It is not necessary that all statements point to the intention of saving strangers. Single prominent statements suffice.

In case of interventions by an international organization, its statements are decisive, not the statement of member states. If a coalition of willing states intervenes, focus on the statements by representatives of the most important state.

Against whom or what was the intervention primarily directed? (TARGET)

- Against certain activities, no matter who commits them 0
- against the side that was the government at the beginning of the emergency 1
- against a group that rebelled at the beginning of the emergency 2
- against foreign forces in the target country 3
- no data -99

Sources: Mandate, statements, case-specific literature on activities.

It is possible that non-state actors topple the government during the intervention. In such cases, the code refers to the situation at the beginning of the intervention.

In the following, we give some hints for assessing the intervention's partiality. An intervention usually takes sides, if it tries to prevent the defeat of one conflict party (see LOST) or if it strives for a regime change (see REGIME). An intervention is also partisan if it tries to enforce a ceasefire or peace agreement (see ENFORCE) and acts first and foremost against one warring party. If, however, an intervention enforces its mandate against all sides, it is treated as impartial.

An interposition mission (see INTERPOS) is impartial. If the intervener tries to disarm and/or demobilize all conflict parties (see DISARM), it is also impartial. By contrast, if the intervention tries to disarm and/or demobilize only one party to the conflict, it usually takes sides. If, however, a substantial part of the disarmed and/or demobilized party is integrated into the state force, categorize the intervention as impartial. A substantial integration is given, when the affected conflict party provides at least 3,000 troops or 20% of the staff in the state's military or police forces.

Other activities are not per se impartial or partisan, e.g. the delivery of humanitarian aid can be conducted impartially or be directed primarily against one side.

In case that the activities of an intervener point to different directions, identify the intervention's focus and code accordingly. The actor who is object to most of the intervener's offensive activities is regarded as primary target.

Best estimate of maximum number of combatants at the disposal of the primarily targeted side (TATROOP)

- number of troops
- not relevant -88
- no data -99

Sources: Non-State Actor Data (variable "rebestimate"), country reports in the IISS Yearbooks "The Military Balance", UCDP External Support Dataset.

Report the maximum number of the targeted side's troops during the intervention. If the targeted side was a foreign force (i.e. TARGET=3), report only the maximum number of the troops deployed in the

target country of the intervention. The code is “-88” for “not relevant”, if the coding for TARGET is “0” or “-99”.

Did the intervening forces actively fulfill their mandate or did they remain passive? (ACTIVE)

- deployed forces remained passive 0
- deployed forces were active 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
The following items on the intervention’s activities are only relevant, if the code for ACTIVE is “1”.

General remark on the intervention’s activities
The following items are about the intervention’s activities which can vary over the course of the intervention. We try to capture these variations by providing the time period of the respective activity.
We concentrate on activities that were backed by the use of force or the threat of using force. Thus, if an intervention engaged in disarming without using force or threatening the use of force, the corresponding activity has to be coded as “no”. The threat of using force is given when the state or organization that deployed the troops authorized them to use force.
In the case description report only the start dates and end dates of activities that were conducted in the course of the intervention. Example: If INTERPOS=0, then do not mention STARINTE and ENDINTE in the case description but give the relevant code (“-88” for “not relevant”) in the data table.

Did the state or organization that deployed the intervention troops authorize the use of force for any activity? (FORCE)

- no 0
- yes 1
- unclear -77
- no data -99

Sources: resolutions, decisions or statements by the mandating body, for instance UN Security Council resolutions, decisions by other international organizations, and statements by state representatives. Be aware that peace accords and ceasefire agreements can invite third parties to intervene.

Did the intervening forces engage in a mission of interposition? (INTERPOS)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.

Interposition means that the intervening forces are deployed between the parties to the conflict, e.g. along the last frontline or a defined zone of separation.

See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start interposition? (STARINTE)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end interposition? (ENDINTE)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening forces engage in demobilizing and disarming local forces? (DISARM)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.

Activities of disarming also include efforts to get the conflict parties' weapons under control or to establish oversight over these arms.

In a certain sense, targeted interventions that try to enforce a peace plan (see ENFORCE), to prevent the defeat of one side (see LOST), or to bring about a regime change (see REGIME) also aim at disarming one party to the conflict. As these activities are covered by separate variables, they do not imply that DISARM is "1". DISARM is reserved for other activities.

See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to demobilize and disarm local forces? (STARDISA)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end demobilizing and disarming local forces? (ENDDISA)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening forces engage in protecting civilians? (CIVILIAN)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
The item CIVILIAN can encompass activities that are relevant for the items HUMANAID, NOFLY, and SAFEAREA. As some mandates request the protection of civilians without specifying the activities, we need also the item CIVILIAN.
See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to protect civilians? (STARCIVI)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end protecting civilians? (ENDCIVI)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening forces engage in protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid? (HUMANAID)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid? (STARHUMA)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid? (ENDHUMA)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening troops engage in enforcing a no-fly zone? (NOFLY)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to enforce a no-fly zone? (STARFLY)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end enforcing a no-fly zone? (ENDFLY)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening troops engage in enforcing a safe area or protection area on the ground? (SAFEAREA)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to enforce a safe area or protection area on the ground? (STARAREA)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of when its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end enforcing a safe area or protection area on the ground? (ENDAREA)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening troops engage in enforcing the acceptance or implementation of a ceasefire for the entire conflict or of a peace agreement? (ENFORCE)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
Locally limited ceasefires are not relevant here.
See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to enforce a ceasefire for the entire conflict or a peace agreement? (STARENFO)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end enforcing a ceasefire for the entire conflict or a peace agreement? (ENDENFO)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening troops engage in helping one conflict party avoid its military defeat? (LOST)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
Do not confuse the result of a war with the intervener's declared intention.
See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to help one conflict party avoid its military defeat? (STARLOST)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end helping one conflict party avoid its military defeat? (ENDLOST)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Did the intervening troops engage in bringing about a regime change? (REGIME)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.
Regime change means to topple the current government and can include re-establishing a former government. Do not confuse the result with the intervener's declared intention. Refer to statements by the intervener on the objective of regime change and show that the intervener's activities corresponded to that aim.
See the general remark on the intervention's activities.

When did the intervening forces start to bring about a regime change? (STARREGI)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant -88

If there is no information on the activity's first occurrence, report the date of its mandate. If there was no such mandate, approximate the start date.

When did the intervening forces end bringing about a regime change? (ENDREGI)

- (day), month, year
- not relevant , as the intervention is ongoing -77
- not relevant, as the intervention did not start such an activity -88

If there is no information on the activity's last occurrence, report the end date of the entire intervention.

Were ground forces deployed in the target country? (GROUNDFO)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, Yearbook "The Military Balance" by IISS, case-specific literature.

In the case of deployed ground forces, what was their maximum size? (GROUNDNO)

- maximum number of ground forces
- not relevant -88
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, Yearbook "The Military Balance" by IISS, case-specific literature.

Our understanding of ground forces only includes military troops.

Population in the year of the interveners' maximum troop strength (POPYMTS)

- number of residents (rounded to hundred thousand)
- no data -99

This information is only given in the intervention dataset but not in the intervention-year dataset and in the case descriptions.

Identify the year of the interveners' maximum troop strength in the intervention-year dataset. POPYMTS is the number of residents in this selected year.

Population affected in the year of the interveners' maximum troop strength (POPAYMTS)

- number of residents (rounded to hundred thousand)
- no data -99

Sources: case-specific literature.

This information is only given in the intervention dataset but not in the intervention-year dataset and in the case descriptions.

Identify the year of the interveners' maximum troop strength in the intervention-year dataset. POPAYMTS is the number of residents affected in this selected year.

The maximum size of deployed ground forces in relation to the size of the target country's population (GROUNDPO)

- number of deployed ground forces per 100,000 inhabitants
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Use GROUNDNO and POPYMTS to calculate GROUNDPO.

The size of deployed ground forces in relation to the size of the target country's population affected by the violent emergency (GROUNDPOA)

- number of deployed ground forces per 100,000 inhabitants
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Use GROUNDNO and POPAYMTS (in the intervention dataset) respectively POPULATA (in the intervention-year dataset) to calculate GROUNDPOA.

In the intervention dataset, we use the maximum size of deployed ground forces per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas the intervention-year dataset reports the annualized data.

We try to consider only the population in the region affected by the violent emergency. Thus, for the intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003 we only consider the region around Bunia, for the intervention in the same country 2013 only Nord Kivu and South Kivu, for the interventions in Somalia 1992-1995 and 2007– the country without Puntland and Somaliland, for the intervention in Sri Lanka the Northern Province and the Eastern Province, and for the intervention in Sudan 2007– only Darfur.

The maximum size of deployed ground forces in relation to the size of the target country (GROUNDAR)

- number of deployed ground forces per 1,000 km²
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Use GROUNDNO and AREA to calculate GROUNDAR.

The maximum size of deployed ground forces in relation to the size of the target country's regions that are affected by the violent emergency (GROUNDARA)

- number of deployed ground forces per 1,000 km²
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Use GROUNDNO and AREAA to calculate GROUNDARA.

In the intervention dataset, we use the maximum size of deployed ground forces per 1,000 km², whereas the intervention-year dataset reports the annualized data.

We try to consider only the region affected by the violent emergency. See the explanations with regard to GROUNDPO.

Did the intervener use planes, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), or cruise missiles for combat or threatening the use of force? (AIRFORCE)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.

This variable relates to conducting or threatening air strikes. Air transport of combat units is not relevant here.

To what extent did the intervention cover the whole area affected by the violent emergency? (VIOLAREA)

- the intervention was limited to the minor part of the affected area 1
- the intervention took place in the major or entire part of the affected area 2
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, case-specific literature.

Did the intervention face a significant military counter-intervener who deployed troops in the target country? (COUNTTRO)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, IISS Yearbook "The Military Balance", UCDP External Support Dataset, Non-State-Actor Dataset, case-specific literature.

A counter-intervention is conducted by an actor from another state than the target country. This can be the government of this third state or a non-state organization with roots there. The counter-intervention tries to prevent the humanitarian military intervention from fulfilling its tasks (independently from the fact whether the humanitarian military intervention is impartial or partisan). Report only counter-interventions that have a clearly visible military effect.

Who was the most important counter-intervener deploying troops in the target country? (IDTROOPS)

- state or organization
- not relevant -88

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, IISS Yearbook "The Military Balance", UCDP External Support Dataset, Non-State-Actor Dataset, case-specific literature.

Did the intervention face a military counter-intervener who delivered arms to the target country? (COUNTARM)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, IISS Yearbook "The Military Balance", UCDP External Support Dataset, Non-State-Actor Dataset, case-specific literature.

A counter-intervention is conducted by an actor from another state than the target country. This can be the government of this third state or a non-state organization with roots there. The counter-intervention tries to prevent the humanitarian military intervention from fulfilling its tasks.

Who was the most important counter-intervener delivering arms to the target country? (IDARMS)

- state or organization
- not relevant -88
- no data -99

Sources: reports by the intervener, reports by the UN Secretary-General, IISS Yearbook "The Military Balance", UCDP External Support Dataset, Non-State Actor Dataset, case-specific literature.

Moves and motives that counteract the intention of saving strangers

We do not check to what extent an intervener is sincere when he declares the objective of saving strangers, as in most cases such an investigation would be inconclusive. Instead, we check for the presence of some general exclusion principles that would point towards other motives besides the one of saving strangers. Is one of these principles given, the affected intervention is not categorized as a clear case of a humanitarian military intervention. When it is unclear if an exclusion principle is present (code -99) or when only the exclusion principle of self-defense is given **(CONTRA3=1)**, we categorize it as a borderline case. When at least one of the other exclusion principles is present, we don't define the intervention as humanitarian, i.e. a non-case is given.[5]

An intervention's failure to end or to reduce deadly violence is no exclusion principle, since this would bias the analysis by only including successful cases. The intervener's *behavior* often contradicts his declared intention of protecting civilians. Amongst other things, interveners are criticized for disproportionate and indiscriminate force, for condoning collateral damages too airily, for attacking civilians, for looting or for sexual exploitation. However, as it turns out it is impossible to determine absolute or relative thresholds for these kinds of crimes and wrongdoings that would, if surpassed, constitute an exclusion criterion. We nevertheless identify seven moves and declared motives that counteract the intention of saving strangers.

Note for the case description: If you are sure that a certain counteracting move or motive is not given, proceed as follows: Mention this fact in the code for the respective variable (e.g. **CONTRA1=0; CONTRA3=0]** but do not report it with full sentences in the case description. If a certain counteracting move or motive is given, report it both in the code and in the explaining text of the description.

As the CONTRA-variables serve to distinguish between clear cases, borderline cases, and non-cases of humanitarian military intervention, almost all values for them in the dataset are "0" for "not given".

5 Keep in mind that a non-case is also given, when other definitional criteria (force used or threatened, violent emergency before intervention) are not fulfilled.

At least one exclusion principle was given (CONTRA0)

- at least one exclusion principle was given 0
- no exclusion principle was given 1
- unclear -99

If the code for CONTRA0 is “1”, all the following CONTRA-items require the coding “0” for ”no”. If the code for CONTRA0 is “0”, at least one of the CONTRA-items requires a coding with “1” for ”yes.” Multiple counteracting moves and motives are possible. Do not define additional criteria.

Information on moves and motives that are incompatible with a humanitarian military intervention can be found in statements of decision-makers and in analyses on the relationship between the target country and the intervening power.

The intervener denied the target country the right to exist (CONTRA1)

- no 0
- yes 1
- unclear -99

Source: statements by the intervener in primary sources or secondary literature.

Consider only the time before and during the intervention.

The intervener had territorial demands towards the target country (CONTRA2)

- no 0
- yes 1
- unclear -99

Source: statements by the intervener in primary sources or secondary literature.

Consider only the time before and during the intervention.

The intervening state defended itself (CONTRA3)

- no 0
- yes 1
- unclear -99

Source: statements by the intervener in primary sources or secondary literature.

Self-defense is given when the intervener immediately reacts to a military attack against its territory by the target country. Given that motives for humanitarian military interventions are usually mixed, we assume that self-defense turns an intervention into a borderline case but not into a non-case as long as no other move or motive counteracts the declared humanitarian purpose.

The intervener stressed that the people to be saved belong to his people or nation (CONTRA4)

- no 0
- yes 1
- unclear -99

Source: statements by the intervener in primary sources or secondary literature.

Consider only the time before and during the intervention.

If an intervener evacuates its own citizens in addition to efforts of saving the citizens of the target country, the motive of saving strangers is not counteracted.

The intervener declared the intention to prevent a rival from assuming control over the target country (CONTRA5)

- no, the intervener did not declare that intention 0
- yes, the intervener declared so 1
- unclear -99

Source: case-specific literature.

The rival is a third state, i.e. not the government or an opposition group in the target country.

It is not possible to distinguish the intervener sufficiently from the parties to the conflict in the target country (CONTRA6)

- no, it is possible 0
- yes, it is not possible 1
- unclear -99

Source: case-specific literature.

If the alleged intervener fought on the side of one conflict party right from the start of the violent emergency, it could be more appropriate to categorize the intervener as an actual party to the conflict. Note, however, that the intention of a humanitarian military intervention is not counteracted when an already deployed and internationally mandated robust peacekeeping mission was faced with a new violent emergency and reacted by using force against one party to the conflict.

The intervening forces intervened without an order by their government (CONTRA7)

- no 0
- yes 1
- unclear -99

Sources: statements by the force commander and their government in primary sources or secondary literature.

The intervention's aftermath

Did the violent emergency end within twelve months of the intervention's beginning? (ENDVIOL)

- no 0
- yes 1
- not relevant -88
- no data -99

Look at the intervention's start date (HMISTART) and the end date of the violent emergency (VIOEND) and ascertain whether the violent emergency ended within twelve months of the intervention's beginning.

Please note: The value "1" only indicates that the violence ended within twelve months of the intervention's beginning but it does not state that it ended (only) due to the intervention.

Average number of fatalities of the relevant conflict in the target country prior to the intervention (FATAL1)

- average number of fatalities per day (rounded to the second decimal place)
- no data -99

Use the data calculated for FATALITY.

Calculate the average number of fatalities per day by dividing the total number of fatalities by the total number of days of the violent emergency prior to the intervention.

Average number of fatalities of the relevant conflict in the target country during the intervention (FATAL2)

- average number of fatalities per day (rounded to the second decimal place)
- not relevant, as the intervention is ongoing -88
- no data -99

Calculate the total number of fatalities for the time during the intervention by applying a procedure similar to that described for FATALITY. If events of more than a single day include the end date of the intervention, distribute the number of fatalities in such events evenly over time.

Calculate the average number of fatalities per day by dividing the total number of fatalities by the total number of days.

If the intervention is ongoing, use the code "-88" but report in your case description the average number of fatalities until the date covered by UCDP, if available.

Note that the interveners' losses are not considered for the calculation of the fatalities during the intervention.

Absolute number of fatalities of the relevant conflict in the target country during the intervention year (FATALITYIY)

- exact absolute number of fatalities in the intervention year
- no data -99

This information is only given in the intervention-year dataset but not in the intervention dataset and in the case descriptions.

Calculate the total number of fatalities for the time during the intervention by applying a procedure similar to that described for FATALITY.

If the intervention is ongoing, use the code "-88" but report in your case description the average number of fatalities until the date covered by UCDP, if available. Note that the interveners' losses are not considered for the calculation of the fatalities during the intervention.

Average number of fatalities of the relevant conflict in the target country during the intervention year (FATAL2IY)

- average number of fatalities per day (rounded to the second decimal place)
- no data -99

This information is only given in the intervention-year dataset but not in the intervention dataset and in the case descriptions.

Calculate the total number of fatalities for the time during the intervention by applying a procedure similar to that described for FATALITY.

Calculate the average number of fatalities per day by dividing the total number of fatalities by the total number of days. Mind to use the exact numbers of days for the last year of intervention, i.e. 59 and not 365, if the intervention ended on 28 February.

If the intervention is ongoing, use the code "-88" but report in your case description the average number of fatalities until the date covered by UCDP, if available.

Note that the interveners' losses are not considered for the calculation of the fatalities during the intervention.

Considering the data for the time prior to and during the intervention, how did the average number of fatalities changed in the target country? (FATALCOM)

- change in percent (rounded to percent)
- no data -999

This information is only given in the intervention dataset and in the case descriptions but not in the intervention-year dataset.

Use the data for FATAL1 and FATAL2 and calculate the change in percent.

Please note that the values for FATALCOM do not constitute a statement of causality, as the increase or reduction of deadly violence may not be caused (only) by the intervention.

Text modules to be included in the case descriptions:

- If deadly violence decreased, insert: Please note that the reduced fatality rates do not necessarily constitute a causal link between the intervention and decreasing levels of deadly violence.
- If deadly violence increased, insert: Please note that the increased fatality rates do not necessarily constitute a causal link between the intervention and the escalation of deadly violence.

Precision of the information on the number of fatalities in the intervention's first year (FATALPRE)

- the number was calculated by using georeferenced data 1
- the number was based on other sources 2
- not relevant -88

Best estimate of number of intervening troops who died during the intervention (LOSSES)

- number of troops who died
- no data -99

Source: case-specific literature.

Report the overall number of fatalities, irrespective of causes of death.

Currently, we only report the total number of intervening troops who died during the intervention. For future version of our dataset, we plan to provide annualized data on these losses.

Note that the interveners' losses are not considered in the calculation of the number of fatalities during the intervention.

Losses in relation to the number of deployed ground forces (LOSSRATE)

- portion of ground troops who died
- no data -99

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case descriptions.

Currently, we only report the total number of intervening troops who died during the intervention. For future versions of our dataset, we plan to provide annualized data on these loss rates.

Did a violent emergency occur in the target country within five years after the end of the intervention? (NEWVIOL)

- the original emergency was ended and no new one occurred 0
- a new violent emergency occurred or the original emergency recurred 1
- the item is not relevant, as the original emergency or the intervention was still ongoing or less than five years have passed after the intervention -88
- no data -99

Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (each with the most recent version), UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, case-specific literature.

Another violent emergency is a new armed conflict (see CONFLICT), new one-sided violence (see VIOLENCE), or a new violent non-state conflict (see NONSTATE) that kills at least 25 people in a calendar year.

If there were two or more independent interventions in the same conflict, assess only the development after the last intervention.

Number of fatalities due to the new violent emergency (NEWFATAL)

- number of fatalities
- the item is not relevant, as there was no new violent emergency -88
- no data or the violent emergency is ongoing at the time of coding -99

Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (each with the most recent version), UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

Report the total number of fatalities. If possible, use the georeferenced data to calculate this number. In the case description also report the start date and the end date of the new violent emergency. If the violent emergency is ongoing at the time of coding, the case description reports the number of fatalities until a certain reference date.

Are there indications that the intervention triggered violent emergencies or significantly exacerbated violent emergencies in neighboring countries? (DISLOCATE)

- no 0
- yes 1
- no data -99

Source: case-specific literature.

Violent emergencies in neighboring countries must be mentioned in the UCDP datasets on armed conflicts, one-sided violence or non-state conflicts or in the case-specific literature. Such violent emergencies must not occur later than two years after the end of intervention.

Variables with annualized data in overview

POPULAT	NOFLY
POPULATA	SAFEAREA
MEDIATE6	ENFORCE
MEDIATEI	LOST
ACCORD6	REGIME
ACCORDI	GROUNDNO
EMBARGO6	GROUNDPO
EMBARGOI	GROUNDPOA
INTERVEN1 and I1CCC	GROUNDAR
INTERVEN2 and I2CCC	GROUNDARA
INTERVEN3 and I3CCC	COUNTTRO and IDTROOPS
TATROOP	COUNTARM and IDARMS
INTERPOS	FATALITYIY
DISARM	FATAL2IY
CIVILIAN	LOSSES
HUMANAID	LOSSRATE

Variables in only one version of the dataset

In the intervention dataset only	*In the intervention-year dataset only*
POPYMTS	YEAR
POPAYMTSFATALCOM	FATALITYIY
LOSSRATE	FATAL2IY

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